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N. Janardhan, 
Senior Research Fellow, 
Gulf‐Asia Programme, 
Emirates DiplomaƟc 
Academy, explains that 
“While the U.S‐led 
[Marshall Plan] was 
valued at $13 billion in 
1950 (equivalent of 
$176 billion as of 
2015), BRI is esƟmated 
to be worth over $1 
trillion.” 
Following five years of periodic controversies and criƟcism – some factual, others contrived – President 
Xi Jinping used the Belt and Road (BRI) Forum in April to set the agenda for the next five years of his 
hallmark project. At the forum’s second ediƟon, meant to promote a “stronger partnership network,” 
the Chinese leader pledged to “clean up,” stressed “zero tolerance” to corrupƟon, and emphasized 
readiness to adopt “internaƟonally acceptable” standards in the bidding process of BRI projects in the 
future. This language indicates Beijing’s openness to construcƟve criƟcism and willingness to objecƟvely 
tweak some inherent weaknesses in the strategy and implementaƟon mechanisms for the BRI during the 
2013‐2018 period. It also sets the stage for the start of “BRI 2.0,” where the stress is likely to be on the 
qualitaƟve, rather than just quanƟtaƟve, aƩributes. The following are some analyƟcal pointers on how 
BRI 2.0 is likely to be different from version 1.0, especially keeping in mind what Chinese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Wang Yi referred to as a “high‐quality” shiŌ from “big freehand” to “fine brushwork” in 
planning BRI’s future projects. 
First, BRI is oŌen loosely compared to the post‐World War II Marshall Plan, but this comparison is 
inadequate both in terms of scale and intent. In terms of scale, while the U.S‐led iniƟaƟve was valued at 
$13 billion in 1950 (equivalent of $176 billion in 2015), BRI is esƟmated to be worth over $1 trillion. And, 
in terms of intent, while the United States had to launch the Marshall Plan to counter the Soviet Union’s 
poliƟcal influence in a Cold War milieu, China had no comparable poliƟcal environment that coaxed it 
into launching BRI.  
Second, 131 countries sent delegaƟons to the 2019 forum, up from 110 in 2017. (Beijing claims that 
about 150 countries have endorsed BRI.) Among the aƩendees were representaƟves of the United 
States and more than a dozen European countries, some of them U.S. allies. This makes the mix of the 
BRI parƟcipant countries more internaƟonally representaƟve, aŌer iniƟally being dominated by Asian 
and African countries. BRI is also engaged with internaƟonal organizaƟons like the World Bank, United 
NaƟons Industrial Development OrganizaƟon, and Asia‐Pacific Economic CooperaƟon, among others, 
which will influence the project’s quanƟtaƟve and qualitaƟve aspects. 
Third, for those perplexed by the huge posiƟve responses for the Chinese iniƟaƟve, the logic is simple. 
Given the weak state of economies elsewhere, there is no credible alternaƟve to counter BRI. The Japan‐
India Freedom Corridor is sƟll short of details and the 2018 U.S. commitment of $60 billion for 
infrastructure development in developing countries is not as enƟcing as China’s pledge. Further, BRI is as 
crucial to China’s future as it is to the future of dozens of other countries that are part of the project.  
Fourth, it is true that there have been murmurs of dissaƟsfacƟon and ‘debt trap’ in Sri Lanka, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaysia, among a few others. But the disgruntled list is sƟll only about one‐
tenth the number of the countries that are relaƟvely happy either with the way BRI has panned out or 
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are hopeful about its prospects. To stem the dissaƟsfacƟon, China has had no beƩer opƟon than to 
adopt a reconciliatory approach by renegoƟaƟng contracts with some of the aggrieved. More of this 
cooperaƟve strategy is likely in the future and is already being reflected in China’s relaƟons with 
Africa and the Gulf region.  
At the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China‐Africa CooperaƟon, President Xi introduced 
China’s ‘five‐no’ approach in dealing with Africa to address the discontent among a secƟon of the 
African officials and civil society organizaƟons. These included policies of non‐interference in Africa’s 
internal affairs; respecƟng Africa’s preferred development plan; non‐imposiƟon of its will on African 
countries; provision of assistance without strings aƩached; and not seeking selfish poliƟcal gains 
while invesƟng or financing projects in Africa. This accommodaƟve strategy was also spelled out 
during President Xi’s visit to the United Arab Emirates in 2018: “We must pay greater aƩenƟon to the 
interests of other countries while pursuing our own. Our enterprises must give greater importance to 
their good reputaƟon in their global acƟviƟes, while seeking their investment returns.” Such 
statements could also be linked to China’s renewed bid to encourage the Arab Gulf countries — who 
have some of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds — to proacƟvely parƟcipate in BRI.  
Many in the six‐country bloc have been reluctant parƟcipants because none is formally part of the 
exisƟng BRI corridors and most fear that Iran’s centrality in BRI would strengthen the Islamic Republic, 
thus compromising their interests in the regional power struggle. However, the Arab Gulf countries 
now appear to be more recepƟve to BRI due to the following reasons: it bears the potenƟal to 
influence their future Ɵes with China; the iniƟaƟve adds to the region’s basket of economic 
diversificaƟon consideraƟons; it offers them scope for mulƟlateral partnerships beyond the region 
(Central Asia and Pakistan, for example); and it serves as a potenƟal incenƟve for China to get 
involved in the region’s poliƟcal and security dynamics. 
FiŌh, another qualitaƟve change is China’s newfound emphasis that the BRI is not a stand‐alone 
infrastructure and trade development project. Instead, it is being championed as a mulƟ‐faceted 
instrument that could be linked to bilateral trade, South‐South cooperaƟon, and even sustainable 
development goals. 
Sixth, though it is idenƟfied as an economic iniƟaƟve, BRI could develop into a poliƟcal instrument 
that China may use to challenge America’s global hegemony. Just like the US‐China tariff war is not 
just about trade, BRI too is likely to assume a deeper poliƟcal coloring in the years ahead. In fact, 
Chinese scholar Wang Jisi argued that the BRI is a “strategic necessity” because of the Barack Obama 
administraƟon’s ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ to Asia.  
Finally, since a large part of BRI routes are vulnerable to instability and tension, it is most likely that an 
increase in Chinese investments (people, money, and assets) would see a corresponding increase in 
Chinese security presence to protect its interests. Traces of this strategy are already evident in the 
establishment of a naval base in DjibouƟ in 2017 and the increasing presence of private security firms, 
with reƟred personnel from the People’s LiberaƟon Army, along BRI routes.  
All these factors combined could make BRI 2.0 qualitaƟvely different, which the world at large, and 
the United States in parƟcular, needs to be prepared for.  
"BRI is not a stand‐
alone infrastructure 
and trade development 
project. Instead, it is 
being championed as a 
mulƟ‐faceted 
instrument that could 
be linked to bilateral 
trade, South‐South 
cooperaƟon, and even 
sustainable 
development goals.." 
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